[projects] Port Git, Forge, project navigation, file management, and sessions #8

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opened 2026-09-16 04:13:22 +00:00 by nsaspy · 0 comments
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Parent: #1

RAGE contract

Consume only this issue on rage/<issue>-<slug>. Initialize the run log with the canonical RAGE helper and preserve the immutable full start SHA. Load the canonical rage and adadr skills from lost-rob0t/skills before architecture or implementation. Blocked by the control-plane decision in #2.

Queue blockers: #8

Analyze

  • Cover Magit/Forge, magit-todos, Projectile intent, Dired/Dirvish/TRAMP interactions, Burly/workspaces, vc-gutter, upload, remote paths, and project task discovery.
  • Compare Lem's Legit/project/file-tree facilities with the exact workflows used.

Gate

  • Destructive Git operations require explicit user confirmation and visible targets.
  • Remote/Forge authentication stays outside Git and logs.

Execute

  • Implement status/diff/log/branch/commit/push/pull/issue/PR entry points, project switching/search, file management, remote editing, and session restoration.
  • Reuse external Git where it is the authoritative engine.

Evaluate

  • Run against disposable repositories and a controlled test forge/repository.
  • Test dirty trees, conflicts, detached HEAD, missing remotes, auth failure, and session restore.

Recurse

  • Any destructive ambiguity blocks that command and returns to design.

Acceptance

  • Daily Git/project/file workflows are covered.
  • No command discards unrelated work.
  • Remote failures do not corrupt local state.

Durable evidence

  • Update the relevant facts in .prolog/kb/lem_migration.pl and .prolog/kb/issues.pl in the same change.
  • Record focused red/green evidence, the full local gate, packaging checks, and exact-head CI status.
  • Keep failed iterations and architecture contradictions visible.

Stop conditions

  • Target repository/ref is ambiguous.
  • A command would force-push or delete without explicit approval.
  • Credentials appear in config, arguments, or logs.
Parent: #1 ## RAGE contract Consume only this issue on `rage/<issue>-<slug>`. Initialize the run log with the canonical RAGE helper and preserve the immutable full start SHA. Load the canonical `rage` and `adadr` skills from `lost-rob0t/skills` before architecture or implementation. Blocked by the control-plane decision in #2. Queue blockers: #8 ## Analyze - Cover Magit/Forge, magit-todos, Projectile intent, Dired/Dirvish/TRAMP interactions, Burly/workspaces, vc-gutter, upload, remote paths, and project task discovery. - Compare Lem's Legit/project/file-tree facilities with the exact workflows used. ## Gate - Destructive Git operations require explicit user confirmation and visible targets. - Remote/Forge authentication stays outside Git and logs. ## Execute - Implement status/diff/log/branch/commit/push/pull/issue/PR entry points, project switching/search, file management, remote editing, and session restoration. - Reuse external Git where it is the authoritative engine. ## Evaluate - Run against disposable repositories and a controlled test forge/repository. - Test dirty trees, conflicts, detached HEAD, missing remotes, auth failure, and session restore. ## Recurse - Any destructive ambiguity blocks that command and returns to design. ## Acceptance - [ ] Daily Git/project/file workflows are covered. - [ ] No command discards unrelated work. - [ ] Remote failures do not corrupt local state. ## Durable evidence - Update the relevant facts in `.prolog/kb/lem_migration.pl` and `.prolog/kb/issues.pl` in the same change. - Record focused red/green evidence, the full local gate, packaging checks, and exact-head CI status. - Keep failed iterations and architecture contradictions visible. ## Stop conditions - Target repository/ref is ambiguous. - A command would force-push or delete without explicit approval. - Credentials appear in config, arguments, or logs.
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