RAGE #50: delegated Auto-Dig user session authority #51
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Delete branch "rage/50-delegated-autodig-user-session"
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TDD-first realization for #50, starting from exact Quasar main
aa33622089b7a09745ec41f049c3e03ec3280cd1after #43 merged the durable Auto-Dig lifecycle.Discovery
The lifecycle handlers are merged, but current WebSocket authorization cannot expose them to an external human client:
autodig.*commands;autodig.run.start/pause/resume/stop;Observed RED
Tests-first head
539aeda30ba2194b137c6f68541cdce7c5884e39added authorization tests specifying a generic delegated human Auto-Dig session boundary:starintel.autodig.readgrants only status/get/list;starintel.autodig.controladditionally grants start/pause/resume/stop;CI run #823 (
32939424072) passed frontend/static/type/build plus existing Quasar and Auto-Dig lifecycle/reclaim suites, then failed exactly inautodig-websocket-auth-tests: the delegated registration function was absent, producing six expected failures (FUNCTION, missing session, and unrelated-scope rejection not occurring). This is the observed TDD RED.Minimum realization
Current head
63d2867f9cb7fcab996c1df9cc89217cc7737fc5adds only the session-level mapping needed by those tests:REGISTER-DELEGATED-AUTODIG-USER-SESSIONaccepts an already-validated StarIntel principal/workspace/scope projection;Still required before gateway enablement
This PR is not yet the whole external-auth solution. Follow-on TDD/security work must establish the trusted adapter/authentication seam that supplies the validated principal/scopes and must enforce per-principal run isolation so two users sharing a workspace cannot inspect/control each other's runs merely by knowing
runId. Missing/expired/revoked delegated authority must fail closed.The gateway must remain fail-closed until those properties and exact-head CI are green.